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ABSTRACT 
Recent studies of interorganizational networks have frequently overlooked 
two important phenomena - the structural properties of the entire network and 
changes in the structure of the network over time. This paper suggests a 
strategy for exploring structural changes using discrete time Markov chains. 
Two dimensions of interorganizational network change are described and 
reconceptualized in terms of the stochastic models developed by Wasserman 
(1978a and 1979). The first dimension is a tendency for linkages in a net-
work to be reciprocated. A second dimension is a tendency toward a hierarchy 
of actors. The methods outlined in this paper attempt to describe how these 
tendencies can be quantified in a rigorous manner. 
To illustrate our methodology, data on the board linkages of twenty-
seven public corporations in Minnesota are analyzed. Our study covers the 
years from 1969 to 1977. Markov chains, with structural parameters, are used 
to model the dyads, indegrees, and outdegrees of the corporate network. 
These parameters are estimated and evaluated, and conclusions about changes 
in the board interlock network are discussed. 
• 
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A Study of Change in a Regional Corporate Network 
While there is a growing consensus that the interorganizational networ!k 
is now an important unit of analysis in organizational studies (see Perrow, 
1979; Aldrich, 1979) there has been very little research on studying struc-
tural change in these networks (cf., Allen, 1974, 1978). One problem has been 
the identification of meaningful dimensions of change. At present, there are 
adequate methods to describe structural properties of interorganizational net-
works at one point .in time (e.g., graph theory, hierarchical cluster analysts, 
blockmodels, and smallest space analysis); however, there has been no syste1n-
atic effort to describe how interorganizational networks might change over 
1 time. 
Unfortunately, there are no theories in the formal organizations' litera-
ture that could guide this paper's efforts at developing a methodology to 
2 study interorganizational network change. As a first attempt to develop a 
rigorous, inductive strategy for the study of change, we will borrow from the 
recent work of Wasserman (1978a, 1978b, 1979) on the application of Markov 
models to social networks. Other empirical applications of this technique are 
found in Wasserman (1978a). 
Dimensions of Macro-Structural Change 
Wasserman (1978a) has identified a number of parameters that can be esti• 
mated to describe change in a social network. By examining all the dyads in 
a network over time, a researcher may first pay attention to tendencies away 
from or towards reciprocity. More specifically, he or she might determine 
1) if there is an increased probability of a linkage developing over time be-
tween units i and j when a linkage already exists from j to i; and 2) if 
there is a decreased probability of a linkage between i and j disappearing 
over time when a linkage from j to i is present. Wasserman (1979) suggests 
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that we model each dyad as a Markov chain, theoretically specifying the prob-
abilities of transitional change and estimating four substantive parameters 
that are combined to form these probabilities. The stochastic model for the 
dyad process is discussed below. Hallinan (1978) also studies change in dyads, 
but postulates no substantive model for this change. 
Other parameters can be estimated that describe tendencies away from or 
toward hierarchy. A researcher might wish to see if there is a tendency for 
units which are central in the network to become more central. 3 More specif-
ically, the researcher would determine if the total outflows and inflows of 
units at t 1 affect their subsequent outflows and inflows at t 2• Do units with 
largein- or outdegrees, corresponding to total inflows and outflows, tend to 
have even larger or smaller in-or outdegrees over time; i.e., do they become 
more central or more peripheral? These tendencies can also be quantified using 
Markov models. 
To get an idea of how Wasserman's models may be used to study interorgani-
zational networks, let us discuss them in terms of one common form of inter-
organizational network, a system of interlocking corporate boards. In the 
specific case of 5n interlocking directorate, a tendency towards reciprocity 
implies that someone from organization i may become a member of organization 
j's board if someone from j is already a member of i's board. In studying 
friendship ties the substantive interpretation of reciprocity effects is 
straightforward. Suppose an individual j chooses i as a friend at t 1• It is 
likely that i may choose j as a friend at t 2 - if you are a friend to someone 
they are likely to be a fri~nd to you. However, in reference to a board linkage, 
the substantive meaning of reciprocity is not immediately obvious. On the one 
hand, if we view board linkages as only a means by which organizations rou-
tinize the exchange of technical information or secure scarce resources (see 
Allen, 1974; Mariolis, 1975; Aldrich, 1979), a move to reciprocate board 
-. 
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memberships would seem to be superfluous. A single board interlock can operate 
just as effectively as a mutual interlock to communicate information or to 
negotiate a market transaction. On the other hand, if we view board linkages 
as a means by which organizations express moral or political support for one 
another (see Perrucci and Pilisuk, 1970; Laumann and Pappi, 1976), then a 
move towards reciprocity may be relevant. Organizations symbolically bind 
themselves to one another for all in the environment to see. 
With respect to trends toward hierarchy, we are measuring 1) if organ-
izations, which have a number of other organizations already represented on 
their board, tend co attract more board members from different organizations 
to their board; and 2) if organizations, which are on several boards already, 
tend to be represented on even a greater number of organizations over time. 
One problem here is that organizations. can become more "popular" or "expan-
sive," simply because they grow larger over time. Repeatedly, size bas been 
found to be correlated positively with the number of organizational inter-
locks (see Burt, 1978 and Allen, 1974). In this respect, organizations 
differ from college students in a fraternity. We suggest that the researcher 
may want to neutralize organizational size effects by simply choosing to study 
units both of comparable size and whose sales or assets do not change much o~er 
time. A second problem is. that financial institutions tend to form more board 
linkages than non-financial institutions (see Levine, 1972 and Mariolis, 1979). 
Thus researchers may want to control the number of banks in the network they 
study as well. 
Corporate Interlocks in Minnesota: An Illustration 
We chose to examine interlocking corporate directorates among the largest 
twenty-seven public corporations in Minnesota. Data are for nine years - 1969 
to 1977. 4 
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Corporations were chosen strictly on the basis of their total sales. Be-
muse complete listings of Twin Cities business organizations are not available 
prior to 1974, we turned to.Fortune Magazine's listing of the 1000 largest 
industrials, 50 largest retailers, 50 largest transportations, 50 largest 
utilities, 50 largest commercial banks, 50 largest life insurance companies, and 
50 largest diversified financial companies. The Fortune listings of the 1000 
largest industrials began in 1969. We scanned these lists and identified all 
business firms located in Minnesota. The Appendix lists the regional firms on 
these lists for the nine years. Twenty-seven finns were on the Fortune lists 
for each of the years. 
From the annual report of eaeh firm for each of the nine years we were able 
to identify the board members of each firm and the board members' organizational 
affiliations. For each year a binary 27 by 27 asymmetric adjacency matrix ~as 
constructed. A "l" was placed in a cell (i,j) if some employee of organization 
j was on the board of corporation i, and a "O" otherwise. 
The reader should be aware of two aspects of these data. First, we examine 
linkages of only a subset of the largest corporations in the area for each year. 
Unfortunately, there were several organizations not on the Fortune I'fsts·. for- allJ. nine yearE 
and we had to drop a corporation from the ~nalysis if it was absent from the For-
tune lists for one of the years. Thus we excluded firms which had recently experienced 
rapid growth or decline (.e.g. Tonka), new firms (e.g. Medtronics), privately owned 
corporations (e.g. Cargill), and firms which previously had been privately owned 
but are now public corporations (e.g. Donaldson). This exclusion was necessary 
because of the current lack of stochastic models that allow organizations to· 
enter'and leave the system. 
Secondly, we examine only the linkages among the 27 "core" firms and ignore 
board linkages to all other organizations. We analyze approximately 14.5% of 
the total board linkages of the firms in our network. This is a potential problem. 
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The organization of a local corporate econo~y might very well involve smaller 
units which would be buyers and sellers in the various markets of the larger 
firms and smaller banks and insurance companies that could provide capital. 
· We suspect that the inclusion of these smaller firms would introduce more 
differentiation into the system and force the two bank holding companies into 
the center of the network. Furthermore, by excluding linkages to extra-local 
firms we are ignoring the obvious fact that most of the "core" corporations 
are multi-nationals operating in national and world economies. Linkages to 
"local" firms may be of only secondary importance to them. However, the in-
clusion of extra-local board linkages would open up a "pandora's box" which 
would take us well beyond the modest methodological goals of this paper. 
Processes of Change for Corporate Networks 
In an earlier section we identified two dimensions of macrostructural 
change in~ corporate network, one which focused on reciprocity and the other 
on dominance or centrality. The dimensions of network reciprocity are re-
flected in the changes occuring in the dyadic or pair relationships among the 
27 
organizations. There are (2 ) = 351 dyads in our network. We can categorize 
the dyad transitional changes into 3x3 matrices, displaying the states of the 
351 dyads for every pair of years under investigation. Table 1 gives the 
dyadic transitions for the 8 pairs of consecutive years 1969-70, ••• ,1976-77. 
The second set of dimensions of macro-structural change are of hierarchy. 
For each of the nine years, we examine the indegree (the number of boards that 
j is represented on) and outdegree (the number of businesses represented on 
11s board) process. These correspond to an actor's "popularity" and "expan-
5 
siveness." The distribution of indegrees is less constant ever time than 
that of the outdegrees. This could mean that there is an informal "quota" 
of local firms that can be represented on the boards of these corporations, 
but that the specific local firms may change over time. To best study the 
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outdegree and indegree transitions, we pool the transition matrices for pairs 
of consecutive years, which effectively increases the sample size from 27 to· 
8 x 27 a 216. Statistically, this pooling of infol'1:118tion is justified in tb:e 
next section, where stochastic models of Wasserman (1978a) are presented to 
analyze these data. Tables 2 and 3 give the outdegree and indegree transitions 
from year to year. 'lbe entries are the number of firms with out(in)degree i 
at year t and out(in) degree j at year t+l, where t = 1969,1970, ••• ,1976. 
Stochastic Models to Study Structural Change 
We have isolated three functions of the Twin Cities corporate network 
that will allow us to measure the strength of reciprocity and hierarchy 
formation; dyad process, indegree process, and outdegree process. To determine 
the effects of reciprocated arcs, popularity, and expansiveness on the prob• 
ability of linkages forming, we present three stochastic models. These models 
are·based on the continuous time Markov chains presented in Wasserman (1978a, 
1979) and Holland and"Leinhardt (1977a, 1977b). The models utilized here are 
discrete time Markov chains, each incorporating four parameters into their re-
spective probability transition matrix that can be analyzed to determine ten-
dencies toward reciprocity or hierarchy. Discrete time versions of these con-
tinuous time models avoid the mathematical difficulties that occur when esti-
mating the structural parameters, and appear appropriate for a corporate net-
work since changes in a board of directors occur not continually, but once a 
year. We now present these models and estimate and interpret the structural 
parameters in the next section. 
Let !t = (Xij;t) be the adjacency matrix representing the network at time 
t, where 
[ 
1, 
o, 
if individual from firm j is on the 
board of firm i at time t; 
otherwise 
We can associate ta 1 with 1969, t = 2 with 1970, ••• , and t Q 9 with 1977~ 
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Further, let Dij•t = (X. ··t'X ... t) be the dyadic linkage between corporations 
' . 1J, Jl., 
i and j. A mutual relationship between two corporations is represented as 
(1,1), a null relationship as (O,O), an asymmetric as either (1,0) or (0,1). 
We refer the reader to Chapter 2 in Karlin and Taylor (1975) for a review of 
Markov chain theory. 
We let Dij;t be a discrete time Markov chain on the states {(O,O), (0,1) 
and (1,0), (1,1)} and further assume that Dij;t is statistically independent of 
all other dyads. 6 Associa.ted with the reciprocity stochastic model is the fol-
lowing probability transition function 
pt,t+l a P{X - tlo k} ij;kt ij;t+l ij;t • • 
the probability that the link Xij is either O or 1 at time t+l given that the 
dyad is in state k, one of the four dyad states, at time t. We also assume that 
P!j~: does not depend on the particular pair (i,j) so that P~j~:! = P~ft+l and 
that these conditional probabilities may be arranged in a (3x3) probability 
t t+l transition matrix !R' , shown at the bottom of Table 1. 
According to the reciprocity model, the elements of the reciprocity model 
t t+l 
matrix lR' depend on four parameters A0, A1, µ 0 , µ1• The theoretical prob-
ability transition matrix f~,t+l is a function solely of these four parameters. 
The parameters Ao and Al are measures of the overall rate of change of the net-
work, and µ0 and µ1 measure the "importance" of a reciprocated arc. We further 
discuss these parameters, and functions of them, in the context of our corpo-
rate network, in the next section. 
27 27 
Let IJ·,·t ~ E X. ··t' j = 1,2, ••• ,27, and Oi,•t = E Xi.·t' i = 1,2, ••• , i=l 1.J, j=l J, 
27, be the indegree process for firm j, and the outdegree process for firm i, 
respectively. We now present the popularity model for the indegree process and 
the expansiveness model for the outdegree process, both used to study the hier-
archical structure of the corporate network. Mathematically, the models are 
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identical ••• one need only exchange Oi;t for lj;t' and the four expansiveness 
parameters Ao' A1, ~0, E1, for the four popularity parameters Ao' A1, n0, ~1-
Consequently, we present just the popularity model. 
nie indegree process lj;t represents the number of local firms that indi• 
viduals from corporation j are represented on at time t. Obviously, I .. t J, 
takes on any integer value between O and 26, so that 1 .. t has state space J, 
{O,l, ••• ,26}. We assume that l .. t is statistically independent of the other J, 
indegrees, and has probability transition function 
t,t+l - I pj;kt - P{Ij;t+l = 1 Ij;t = k}. 
The function for the popularity model specifies the probability that individuals 
from corporation j sit on the board of R, firms at time t+l, given that individ-
uals from j sat on the boards of k £inns at time t. We postulate that this functic:>n 
. t t+l _ t t+l does not depend on the specific corporation j, so that P j iki = PkR, • We can 
arrange these probabilities into a (27x27) probability transition matrix ~~,t+l. 
In our corporate network, the magnitude of the outdegrees as well as the · 
indegrees reflects the position of the firms in the corporate hierarchy or how 
"centrally located" they are. In the first case centrality reflects a firm's 
expansiveness; the second case reflects a firm's popularity. The model postu-
lates that as the position of a firm becomes more important in the network, 
as its indegree increas_es, the probability that the indegree Ij; t increases by 
one is a linear function of I j; t· Similarly the probability that the indegree de•• 
creases by one is another linear function. Thus, popular firms tend to become 
more or less popular, solidifying the hierarchical structure of the network; 
as a function of their present popularity. 
We postulate that the transition probabilities depen~ on 4 parameters, 
A0, A1 , measuring the overall rate of change, and n0 , n1 , measuring the effect 
of increased centrality on indegree changes, as follows: 
P{Ij;t+l • i+llij;t • 1} •Ao+ i n0 
P{Ij;t+l •· i-llij;t • i} •Al+ i n1 
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for all j, and i • 0,1, ••• ,26. The probability transition matrix for the 1:n-
degree process, which mathematically is a linear birth-and-death process. fs 
a Jacobi matrix, with positive diagonal, sub-diagonal, and super-diagonal, 
and zeros elsewhere. 
Quantification of the Dimensions of Macro-Structural Change 
We now apply the stochastic models presented in the previous section to 
the data on the Twin Cities corporate network of 1969-1977. To estimate the 
four parameters of each of the three models, we need only compare the theo-
retical probability transition matrices with the empirical probability transi-
tion matrices, constructed from the data in Tables 1, 2, and 3. The empirical 
,._ A A 
probability transition matrices, ER, !E, !p' for the three models, are formed 
first by pooling the year-to-year transition matrices, and then standardizing 
by dividing by row sums. This pooling is justified by the assumption that a 
stationary, first-order Markov chain is operating. 
The estimation procedure is discussed in detail in Wasserman (1978a), 
,.. 
and will not be presented here. In brief, -g is "fitted" to g,using least 
squares, minimizing the "distance" between the "observed" and "expected" 
matrices. 
The estimated parameters of the reciprocity model are: 
" 
"- :::s .019 0 ,.. 
" 
,.. "'o + llo = .015 
Al = .111 ,.. 
" Al+ 1-11 :a .061 ,.. 
-.004 µo -
" µl --.050 
Looking first at XO and xl we can assess, in the absence of reciprocated 
links, if asymmetric ties tend to be formed and if asymmetric ties tend to 
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disappear over time. If these trends are present, values for ~O and ~l will 
be large. As it turns out, the rate of asymmetric ties disappe_aring 
is greater than the rate of appearing (i.e., ~l > ~0). 
The parameter sums ~O + µ0 and ~l + µ1 ,. tell the the probability of 
a linkage between actors i and j forming or disappearing given the condition 
that j is already linked to i. Since ~O + µ0 is equal to .015, we can conclude 
that the presence of reciprocated arcs has little effect on the formation of 
subsequent symmetric linkages. That is, asymmetric ties between actors do 
" " not tend to become symmetric over time. However, since Al+ µ1 is equal to 
.061, we can conclude that symmetric linkages do tend to be transformed into 
asymmetric linkages over time. 
The relationship between our parameters is even better understood if 
we examine estimates of the two reciprocity ratios, p1 and 
= .789 
" ~l + µ1 
p = ~ = .550. 
2 "1 
p2 tells us that a link is only half as likely to disappear over time in the! 
presence ofareciprocated link than in its absence. Thus; there is a tendency 
" for the integrated network to remain integrated. In contrast P1 tells us 
that a reciprocated arc has virtually no impact on linkages from i to j ap-
pearing. So while these networks may remain relatively integrated; there is 
certainly no tendency for the network to "fill up" by asymmetries becoming 
mutuals. The log odds ratio log (p1/p2) a .157 is positive however, implying 
a net, small positive reciprocity effect. 
The four expansiveness model parameter estimates are: 
" A • 0 .163 
" A = .003 
" 1 " AO + 1£0 = .163 - .Olli 
" 
-.011 C: :Ii 0 " A 
A Al+ i&l = .003 + .0481 
e: ::s .048 1 
11 
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The interpretations for 10 and\ in this model are slightly different 
" ,.. 
than in the previous model. In the reciprocity model AO and Al indicated the 
C 
rates of change for dyads, contingent upon the absence of reciprocated arcs. 
;,. ,.. 
! In this model AO and Al are rates of change for outdegrees, contingent upon 
,.. 
the outdegrees being zero. Since AO g .163, we learn that for firms which 
have no "core" actors. re{>res.ented on their board there is a tendency for them 
to recrui.t firms· to their boards over time. As we can see, the rate of change 
of null times to asl7Dlletric ties is, much greater than the rate of change of 
• asymmetric ties to null ties, as measured by the small values of Al• .003. 
~ ,.. ,.. ,.. 
'!'he sums AO+ e0i and Al+ e1i, respectively, describe the probabilities 
that, given a certain level of expansiveness, corporations will establish link-
ag~s where none had existed and will terminate linkages where some had existed. 
For example, if i c 1, (1. e., one "core" firm on its board) then the probabil-
~ ity of a firm recruiting another local firm to its board is .152. In contrast, 
if i = 5, (i.e., five "core" firms) then the probability of a firm recruiting 
an additional firm is .108. Thus we can conclude that for firms which are less 
expansive, there is a greater probability that they will recruit another firm 
in the area (1.e.,they may become more expansive). In contrast, for firms 
which are more expansive, there is a smaller probability that they will recruit 
more local firms (i.e., they may become less expansive). 
On the other hand, if i ~ 1, then the probability of a firm abandoning a 
linkage where one had existed is .051, which if i = 5, then the probability of 
a firm abandoning a linkage goes to .243. This is significant since it suggests 
that firms which have serveral local firms on their board are more likely to 
dismiss firms than firms with fewer local firms on their board. These two 
processes are definitely working against the formation of hierarchy. In the 
first case, we discover that firms which are central tend to recruit fewer firms 
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to their boards over time than more peripheral actors. In addition, we 
further find that more central firms are losing contacts at a greater rate. 
The four popularity parameter estimates are: 
,.. A a .125 
~o + iio =-0 .125 + .017i ,. 
A • .002 ,. ,. 1 Al + i1Tl = .002 + .OSOi 
,.. 
.017 1T -0 
,. 
'Jr -1 .oso. 
,. ,. 
The interpretation o~ Ao and Al for the popularity model 1s similar to 
,.. ,.. 
the interpretation of Ao an~ Al for the expansiveness model. Here AO and Al 
are rates of change for indegrees contingent upon actor j having zero in-
degrees (i.e., j is not represented on any boards). That AO is equal to .123 
sugges.ts that firms which were not on any boards tend to go on boards over 
time and that Al is equal to .002 suggests that it is very seldom that less 
popular firms go off boards. Again in this model we see that AO is con-
,. 
siderably greater than A1 • 
,.. ,.. ,.. ,. 
The parameters, AO+ ~0i and A1 + 1r1i take into account the relative 
impact of actors' indegrees (or popularity) on their likelihood of 
going on or going off. The first equati~n sh@ws that for mere popu-
lar actors there is a tendency for linkages to be formed where no 
ties had existed previously. The second shows that for more popular actors 
there is also a trend to abandon linkages. These popularity findings really 
do not contradict one another; they s~mply indicate that the more pop~lar 
firms tend to go "on and off" boards more frequently than less popular firms. 
JI. 
.. 
! 
J 
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Conclusions 
....... ·-···-- ...... . 
First, let us briefly review what we found with respect to reciprocity 
A ~ 
effects. The sum, AO+ µ0 = .015, is the probability that two firms which are 
already linked by an asymmetric tie will establish a symmetric board interlock 
. A A 
between themselves. The sum, Al+ µ1 m .061, is the probability that two firms, 
which have a mutual linkage, will tend to terminate one of the board linkages. 
~ A A A 
Since Al+ µl >AO+ µ0 , we can conclude that over this nine year period it 
was more common for organizations to turn symmetric ties into asymmetric ties 
than to convert asymmetric ties to symmetric ties. 
The parametera describing tendencies toward hierarchy are a little more 
A 
difficult to interpret. The parameters sum, Ao+ ie:0 , is the probability 
that a firm will recruit another core firm to its board given that i organ-
izations in the community are on its board already. In Figure 1 we see that 
the probability of firms establishing more linkages with local actors goes 
down as the number of local firms on the board goes up. The parameter sum 
Al+ i£1 , is the probability that a firm will exclude a local firm from its 
board given that i organizations are on its board already. In Figure 1 we 
see that the probability of firms terminating interlocks goes up as the 
number of organizations on its board goes up. In light of these findings 
it appears that instead of a hierarchy forming (central actors becoming more 
central), there are tendencies toward maintaining some balance or equilibrium in 
the network, preventing any subset of finns from becoming too central in the system. 
A second set of parameters also were used to measure tendencies toward bier-
archy. The parameter sum, AO+ i~0 , is the probability that a firm will be re-
presented on another board given that it is already on i boards. In Figure 2 
we see that the probability of a firm going on another board goes up as the 
number of boards that it is on goes up. Finally, the parameter sum, Al+ in1 , 
is the probability that a firm will go off a local board given the number of 
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boards it is on. In Figure 2 we see that the probability of a firm going 
off a board goes up as the number of boar~s it is oti goes up. These findin1Js 
, 
may appear to be contradictory; however, given that ~l >~Owe can conclude 
that there is a greater tendency for "popular" firms to terminate relations 
as they become more popular than for popular firms to become more popular. 
This would be consistent with the previous findings indicating that there 
may be a certain equilibrium that prevents networks from becoming highly 
centralized or hierarchical. 
Needless to say, our efforts are exploratory. Our goal is to demonstrate 
how the theory of Markov chains can be used to describe certain dimensions of 
structural change in interorganizational systems. Our specific.findings on 
Minnesota corporate interlocks are difficult to interpret simply because they 
are the first of their kind. We do not know if in other states symmetric 
linkages are tending to become more asymmetric indicating perhaps an un-
raveling of a very dense system. Nor do we know if elsewhere there are ten~ 
dencies toward equilibrium working against the development of a hierarchically 
ordered regional corporate network. Similarly, we do not know if the patterns 
we found for these nine years are comparable to interlock patterns in this 
state 20 years ago. 
Given the various problems with our data that we discussed earlier, we 
offer our specific analyses as a model for future research. only with great 
reservation. However, we do believe that that application of stochastic models 
to the analysis of interorganizational networks does have a great deal of pro-
mise. By applying these models to corporate boards, we have been able to de-
scribe basic, substantively meaningful structural changes in the network as a 
whole. Obviously, the next step is to explain why the changes take place. Our 
hope is that this research note stimulates the curiosity of organizational re-
searchers and hastens the development of theory and appropriate methodologies 
for the study of interorganizational systemic change. 
• 
' 
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APPENDIX: Twin Cities' Corporations on Fortune's Lists of Top Earning U.S. 
Corporations. 
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
INDUSTRIA~S 7 American Crystal X X X X X X X X X 
4l 
American Hoist & Derrick X X X X X X X X X 
Apache X X X X X X X X X 
~ Artie Enterprises X X 
Bemis X X X X X X X X X 
Control Data X X X X X X X X X 
Data 100 X X X 
DeLuxe Check Printers X X X X X X X X X 
Donaldson Co. X X X X 
Economics Lab X X X X X X X X X 
Farmers' Union Exchange X X X X X 
General Mills X X X X X X X X X 
George Hormel X X X X X X X X X 
Green Giant X X X X X X X X X 
Fingerhut X X X 
H. B. Fuller S X X X X X 
Hoerner Waldorf X X X X X X X X 
Honeywell X X X X X X X X X 
International Multifoods X X X X X X X X X 
Jostens X X X X X X X X X 
Land O'Lakes 9 X X X X X X X X X 
McQuay Perfex X X X X X X X 
MEJ X 
-,.. Mcdtronics X X X 
Midwest Cooperatives X X X X X X X X 
Northrup King X X 
Minn. Mining & Manufacturing X X X X X X X X X 
Munsingwear X X X X X X X X X 
Peavey X X X X X X 
Pillsbury X X X X X X X X X 
Tonka X X X 
Toro X X X X X X X X X 
COMMERCIAL BANKING COMPANIES 
First Bank System X X X X X X X X X 
Northwest BANCO X X X X X X X X X 
RETAILING COMPANIES 
Dayton-Hudson X X X X X X X X X 
Gamble-Skogmo X X X X X X X X X 
TRANSPORTATIONS 
Burlington-Northern X X X X X X X X X 
North Central X X X X X X X X 
Northwest Orient X X X X X X X X X 
Soc Line X X X X X X X X X 
UTILITIES 
NSP X X X X X X X X X 
J 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES 
Minnesota Mutual X X X X X X X X X 
Northwestern National X X X X X X X X X 
DIVERSIFIED FINANCIAL COMPANIES 
IDS X X X X X X X 
St. Paul Companies X X X X X X X 
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FOOTNOTES 
' 1. For a review of the recent literature on interorganizational relations and 
a description o( the theoretical and methodological problems involved in . 
the study of these networks, see Laumann, Galaskiewicz, and Marsden (1978) 
and Aldrich (1979). 
2. We suspect that the research of population ecologists on selective 
environmental mechanisms holds the most promise (see Hannan and Freeman, 
1977). Yet the focus in this literature has been on the composition of 
the organizational population with no attention given to the network 
structures among organizations. 
3. Several authors have suggested that an organization's centrality in an 
interorganizational network is an indi.ca.tor of its dominance. See 
Galaskiewicz (1979) for a sunnnary discussion of these issues. 
4. The reasons for choosing this type of interorganizational system are: 
1) the organizations in the network are directly comparable, 2) this ty~e 
of interorganizational linkage is more easily interpretable than.others, 
3) the number of linkages that organizations can sustain is fairly con-
stant over time, i.e., organizations tend to· have the same number of 
board members over extended periods of time, 4) there has been very little 
change in the composition of the population of organizations over this 
nine year period, 5) recent work by Mariolis (1975) and Allen (1978) sug-
gest that regional corporate interlock networks are meaningful economic 
subsystems in their own right, and 6) the data were readily available. 
5. For the time being, we will use the notions of an organization's popu-
larity and expansiveness. These characterizations of indegree and out-
degree processes are taken from the literature on friendship systems. 
Individuals who receive many choices as friends are "popular" while those 
who say they have many friends are "expansive." For corporate interloclt..s 
the substantive meaning of indegrees and outdegrees is somewhat similar~ 
An organization which is represented on many outside boards is "popular" 
while an organization which allows many local firms on its board is 
"expansive." 
6. See Wasserman (1978a) for comments on the assumption. 
7. American Crystal only moved to Minnesota in 1974 from Denver. For this 
reason it was not included in our sample of organizations. 
8. On February 22, 1977, Hoerner Waldorf merged with Champion Internationa1. 
Despite this, Hoerner Waldorf was included in our sample •. 
9. Land O'Lakes is a cooperative and an inspection of its board showed that 
all members are dairy farmers. Because of the uniqueness of this organi-
zation, it was excluded from our analysis. 
4 
y 
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TABLE l. Dyadic Transitions for Every Pair of Consecutive Years, and 
Theoretical Probability Transition Matrix for the Reciprocity Model. 
N = null dyad; A= asymmetric dyad; M = mutual dyad. ~ 
1970 1971 • 
N A M N A M 
N 301 7 0 308 N 295 8 0 303 
1969 A 2 35 2 39 1970 A 4 38 0 42 
M 0 0 4 4 M 0 0 6 6 
303 42 6 299 46 6 
1972 1973 
N A M N A M 
N 294 5 0 299 N 205 5 0 · 299 
1971 A 5 41 0 46 1972 A 5 41 0 46 
M 0 0 6 6 M 0 0 6 6 
299 46 6 299 46 6 
.. 
• 
~ 
1974 1975 
N A M N A M 
N 297 2 0 299 N 296 5 0 301 
1973 A .4 42 0 46 1974 A 9 35 0 44 
M 0 0 6 6 M 0 0 6 6 
301 44 6 305 40 6 
1976 1977 
N A M N A M 
N 300 5 0 305 N 298 8 0 306 
1975 A 6 33 1 40 1976 A 3 34 2 39 
M 0 1 5 6 M 0 2 4 6 
306 39 6 301 44 6 r-
N A M 
Ir 
N l-2A 0 2A0 0 
pt, t+l. 
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